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Abstract
In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources,
wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives down-
stream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive
fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both
varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier
makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the
cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream
profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing
results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price
discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The literature on price discrimination in intermediate good markets has focused mainly on situations where an
upstream supplier is unconstrained or where downstream firms single source. However, downstream firms often have
access to different suppliers, rather than being locked into a single upstream supplier. They also frequently multisource
and do not allocate all of their volume to a single supplier on the basis of price alone even when upstream firms produce
a relatively homogenous input for their product.1 Moreover, if there is differentiation between the products of the
upstream firms, then downstream firms may be purchasing from different suppliers to produce different varieties of
their own products. Indeed, when the downstream activity is retailing, often multiple upstream differentiated suppliers’
products are sold by each downstream competitor. For example, grocery stores commonly sell both branded products
supplied by dominant manufacturers and differentiated varieties, including private labels.
This paper revisits the impact of price discrimination by a dominant supplier on downstream innovation incentives
and welfare in a model where downstream firms resell both the supplier’s product and a differentiated substitute
available from a competitive fringe. We identify downstream firms’ investment in reducing the cost of access to the
differentiated alternative as a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination may improve the dynamic
efficiency of the market. A lower cost of accessing the fringe product may result from the retailer investing in own
distribution assets specific to that product.2
If a monopoly supplier price discriminates against single‐product downstream firms, the retailers which are more
efficient in retailing pay a higher price because their demand for the supplier’s product is less elastic (DeGraba, 1990;
Katz, 1987). This ‘distortion’ effect (handicapping of more efficient firms) is also present in our setting with upstream
competition and multiproduct retailers. However, we focus on an additional effect by distinguishing between
downstream firms’ relative efficiency in retailing and their relative efficiency in acquiring the differentiated substitute.
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When the dominant supplier price discriminates, the retailer which is more efficient in acquiring the competitively
supplied product may enjoy a lower wholesale price than its rival. This is because the retailer with a cost advantage in
sourcing the differentiated substitute would have a more elastic demand for the dominant supplier’s product when the
retailers are equally efficient in retailing.
Starting from this additional effect, our study explores the impact of wholesale price discrimination on retailers’
incentives to reduce the cost of acquiring the differentiated substitute. We consider a setting where two multiproduct
retailers first invest in reducing the cost of access to the competitively supplied product. Then, the dominant supplier
sets wholesale price(s) for its product. We compare two pricing regimes: Under price discrimination, wholesale prices
may be differentiated across the two retailers, whereas under uniform pricing, both retailers pay the same price. In the
final stage of our baseline model, the retailers compete in quantities for final consumers and profits are realized.
Our analysis shows that wholesale price discrimination by the dominant supplier fosters the retailers’ incentives to
invest in reducing the marginal cost of acquiring the differentiated variety. Under price discrimination, a relative
advantage in sourcing the competitively supplied product triggers a (larger) wholesale price reduction and so the
retailers invest more than under uniform pricing to lower the cost of acquiring the differentiated alternative. Moreover,
when the retailers share the same downstream retailing technology and invest in improving own access to the imperfect
substitute product, wholesale price discrimination boosts downstream welfare, calculated as the sum of consumer
welfare and downstream profits, compared to a uniform pricing regime.
The dynamic efficiency of wholesale price discrimination was first analyzed by DeGraba (1990). In his model, an
upstream monopoly supplies an input to two downstream firms which may differ in their production costs. These
downstream production costs are conceptually related to our retailing costs. Thus, from the perspective of our model,
DeGraba (1990) focuses on downstream firms’ incentives to reduce retailing costs and shows that wholesale price
discrimination lowers a firm’s benefit from investment. This is the case because having a lower cost leads to a higher
input price. He also shows that the underinvestment in cost reduction due to price discrimination results in higher
marginal costs and, under reasonable conditions, lower welfare than under a credible commitment to uniform pricing.3
In general, when downstream firms may differ in both retailing cost and the cost of sourcing the differentiated
alternative, and they can invest to reduce both these costs, the impact of wholesale price discrimination on innovation
and welfare is determined by a trade‐off between the (stifling) effect in DeGraba (1990) and the (fostering) effect
highlighted in our analysis. By allowing for upstream competition and retailers which source multiple differentiated
varieties, our analysis points to a wider principle whereby intermediate product price discrimination decreases
(increases) multiproduct retailers’ incentives to make investments that boost (lower) their demand for the dominant
supplier’s product.
Analyzing the static efficiency of third‐degree price discrimination in intermediate product markets, Katz (1987)
considers a setting where an upstream monopolist supplies an input to independent downstream duopoly markets. In
each market, one firm poses a threat of backward integration, so the upstream monopolist has incentives to price
discriminate. If there is no integration in equilibrium regardless of the pricing regimes, then input price discrimination
always leads to lower output and welfare and, under reasonable conditions, to higher prices to all buyers. However, if
uniform pricing leads to integration but price discrimination does not, then the latter may prevent socially inefficient
integration and raise welfare.4
Price discrimination allows the upstream monopolist to appropriate some of the benefits of a distributor’s superior
technology, but it results in the allocation of a higher share of downstream output to less efficient retailers (compared to
the uniform pricing regime) and so it harms total welfare when it does not change total final output. Yoshida (2000)
considers more general downstream technologies which allow price discrimination to alter total final output and shows
that, although the impact of input price discrimination on final good output and welfare is in general ambiguous, the
practice harms total welfare if it results in higher final good output. Valletti (2003) revisits Yoshida’s model and, by
introducing a decomposition of the upstream monopolist’s profit into a part that depends on the average input price and
another part which depends on the distribution of input prices, shows that under reasonable conditions the practice
harms both total welfare and consumer surplus.5
Inderst and Valletti (2009) explore price discrimination by an upstream monopolist when two single‐product
downstream firms have access to a perfect substitute input once they pay a fixed cost (e.g., if they integrate backward).6
They analyze retailers’ incentives to invest in reducing downstream marginal costs in this setting.7 In contrast, we
consider multiproduct downstream competitors, which always distribute both the dominant supplier’s product and a
competitively supplied differentiated variety, and focus on retailers’ incentives to invest in the cost of access to the
differentiated alternative.
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In the context of our model, the results that Inderst and Valletti (2009) obtain for a general demand specification
imply that one of the downstream competitors invests more in retailing cost reduction under wholesale price
discrimination than under uniform pricing. For linear demand and quadratic investment costs, Inderst and Valletti
(2009) also show that both downstream firms invest more under discriminatory pricing when the fixed cost of switching
to the alternative input is low. In our model, although the equilibrium depends on the pricing regime, it is symmetric
both under price discrimination and under uniform pricing. For tractability, we also focus on linear demand and
quadratic investment costs and show that wholesale price discrimination always results in a larger investment in
reducing the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety. This is because, under price discrimination, a
dominant supplier has an incentive to offer a better deal to a retailer which is more efficient in substituting away from
its product.
In European case law, a dominant firm applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties may be found guilty of abusing its dominant position even when discrimination serves to meet
competition.8 For example, Irish Sugar was found guilty of granting special rebates to certain retailers established
along the border with Northern Ireland to compete with cheap imports of sugar from the region repackaged for
retail sale. The European Court of First Instance has ruled that ‘confronting’ competition from sugar imported
from Northern Ireland is not an objective economic justification for border rebates as these were aimed at
preventing such competition from developing in the rest of Ireland.9 This approach assumes that allowing the
dominant firm to credibly commit to uniform pricing will have no impact on the costs of alternative supply.
However, if a retailer knew that by improving access to alternative product it could access also the dominant
firms’ product at lower prices than its rivals, it would put more effort into reducing the cost of alternative supply.
Thus, as our analysis confirms, the efficiency of alternative supply may be higher when the dominant supplier
cannot commit to uniform pricing.
2 | THE MODEL
Consider a vertically related industry. An upstream dominant firm (M) and a competitive fringe supply differentiated
(intermediate) productsU and S, respectively, to a downstream market. The upstream marginal costs of production are
constant and normalized to zero. Downstream, two independent retailers A and B both resell the two differentiated
varieties and compete in quantities for final consumers. One unit of the wholesale product corresponds to one unit of
the retail good. We consider downstream retailers, but the model could be interpreted alternatively as a production
chain where each downstream firm produces the same two differentiated products. One of the downstream goods is
produced from one unit of the dominant upstream supplier’s product, while the other from one unit of competitively
supplied input.
In the retail product market, inverse demand functions for the two varieties, U and S, are
P q q α βq γq P q q α βq γq( , ) = − − and ( , ) = − − ,U U S U S S U S S U (1)
where q q q= +l A
l
B
l denotes the total quantity of product l U= , S, and α, β, γ > 0. γ captures the degree of product
differentiation. β γ> , that is, an increase in the supply of S (U ) has a greater impact on the price of S (U ) than on the
price of U (S). The representative consumer’s quadratic utility function which corresponds to (1) is presented in the
appendix.10
Under a price discrimination regime, the dominant supplier may charge differentiated prices (i.e., ≠w wA B), while
under a uniform pricing regime, M must charge the same wholesale price to both retailers (i.e., w w=A B).11 The latter
situation would apply in the presence of a ban on price discrimination. A and B’s constant marginal costs of acquiring
the competitively supplied variety are cA and cB, respectively, where c c m= −i i (for c > 0). Retailer i A= , B can
achieve cost reductionmi by spending ∕m mΓ( ) = 2i i2 . The downstream firms, A and B, face marginal retailing costs, dA
and dB, respectively. In the context of a production chain, these could be regarded as downstream operation or
production costs which apply to both products.12 We explore the dynamic efficiency of wholesale price discrimination,
by focusing on retailers’ incentives to invest in the reduction of ci.
We analyze a three‐stage model where the retailers first invest simultaneously to reduce the cost of access to S, then,
the dominant supplier sets either a uniform price or discriminatory wholesale prices, depending on the pricing regime,
and finally the retailers compete in quantities for final consumers. We solve by backward induction for the subgame
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perfect Nash equilibria. We start by analyzing the third stage of the game below. Section 3 explores the dominant
supplier’s choice of wholesale prices under uniform pricing and under price discrimination, while Section 4 analyzes
retailers’ investments in cost reduction. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results and presents final conclusions.
All proofs missing from the text are relegated to the appendix.
2.1 | Competition in the final product market
In the final stage of the game, retailers compete by simultaneously choosing quantities of the two varieties. Retailer i
(for i A= , B) chooses qi
U and qi
S to maximize its profit
π P w d q P c d q= ( − − ) + ( − − ) ,i U i i iU S i i iS
where PU and PS are given by (1). The first‐order conditions of retailer i’s profit maximization problem require that
∂ ∕∂π q = 0i iU and ∂ ∕∂π q = 0i iS .
The unique equilibrium quantities for given wholesale prices and marginal costs are
q
β a a γ a a
β γ q
β a a γ a a
β γ=
(2 − ) − (2 − )
3( − ) and =
(2 − ) − (2 − )
3( − ) ,i
U U
i
U
j
S
i
S
j
i
S S
i
S
j
U
i
U
j
2 2 2 2
for i, ∈j A B{ , } and ≠i j, where a α w d= − −Ui i i and a α c d= − − .Si i i
In contrast to existing work, our analysis focuses on the impact of wholesale price discrimination on downstream
firms’ incentives to reduce the cost of acquiring the differentiated alternative, that is, ci. Alternatively, downstream
firms could invest in reducing operation or retailing costs, di. In our model, the differentiated alternative is supplied by
a competitive fringe, and so it can be treated parametrically as part of the downstream demand function. Therefore, if
the retailers invest to reduce retailing costs, the results in DeGraba (1990)—where the upstream supplier is an
unconstrained monopolist—carry over unchanged to our framework. Inderst and Valletti (2009) consider a model
where an alternative supply is a perfect substitute of the upstream firm’s product. In their analysis, marginal cost
reductions apply to both the dominant and alternative supply, although in equilibrium downstream firms do not use
the latter. The corresponding cost reductions in our framework would be those that affect the retailing costs (di).
3 | WHOLESALE PRICES
In the second stage, the upstream supplier M sets the wholesale prices, wA and wB to maximize its profit
π w q w q= + .M A AU B BU
Under wholesale price discrimination, the dominant supplier can set ≠w wA B. The equilibrium prices for given
marginal costs are
w γα β α d γ d cβ w
γα β α d γ d c
β=
− + ( − ) + ( + )
2
and = − + ( − ) + ( + )
2
.A A A A B B B B (2)
So, when the dominant supplier price discriminates,
w w β γ d d γ c cβ− =
( − )( − ) + ( − )
2
.B A A B B A (3)
If retailers are equally efficient in acquiring the competitively supplied product (i.e., if c c=B A), then the sign of
w w( − )B A is given by the sign of d d( − )A B . In particular, if retailer A is more efficient in retailing (i.e., d d<A B), then it
will pay a relatively higher price w w>A B.
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A similar exercise illustrates how discriminatory wholesale prices are affected by differences in retailers’ costs of
sourcing the competitively supplied product. If there are no differences in retailing efficiency (so d d=A B), the sign of
w w( − )B A is given by the sign of c c( − )B A and so, if retailer A is more efficient in acquiring product S (i.e., c c<A B),
then it will be offered a relatively better deal by a price‐discriminating dominant supplier (i.e., w w<A B).
Intuitively, if the dominant supplier price discriminates, a retailer which is more efficient in acquiring
the competitively supplied product has more incentives to divert sales of the dominant supplier’s product to the
differentiated alternative. Then, to prevent a retailer who is more efficient in sourcing S from diverting units, the
supplier needs to charge it a lower wholesale price. In general, w w( − )B A increases in d d( − )A B and decreases in
c c( − )A B . The larger the advantage of A in distribution, the higher the wholesale price it has to pay—discrimination
favors the less efficient in distribution—and the larger the advantage of A in access to the differentiated alternative, the
lower the wholesale price it has to pay—discrimination favors the retailer with a better access to the alternative.
Under uniform pricing, the supplier sets w w=A B and the equilibrium wholesale price for given marginal costs is
w γα β α d d γ d c d cβ=
−2 + (2 − − ) + ( + + + )
4
.U A B A A B B (4)
Using (2) and (4), the changes in wholesale prices when the dominant supplier price discriminates are given by
w w β γ d d γ c cβ w w
β γ d d γ c c
β− =
( − )( − ) + ( − )
4
and − = ( − )( − ) + ( − )
4
.A U B A A B B U A B B A
We summarize these preliminary findings below.
Lemma 1 (a) If retailers are equally efficient in acquiring the competitively supplied product (c c=A B) and A is
more efficient in retailing (d d<A B), under price discrimination A (B) pays a higher (lower) wholesale price than
under uniform pricing, that is, w w w> >A U B. (b) If retailers are equally efficient in retailing (d d=A B), but A is
more efficient in acquiring the competitive product (c c<A B), A (B) pays a lower (higher) wholesale price with price
discrimination than with uniform pricing, that is, w w w< <A U B.
Part (a) of Lemma 1 corresponds to existing results in the literature. By considering a differentiated alternative at the
upstream level, part (b) identifies a novel efficiency channel. If the dominant supplier can discriminate between
retailers, it offers a lower wholesale price to the downstream firm which is more efficient in acquiring the competitively
supplied variety to prevent it from substituting away from its product. So, a retailer which can acquire the differentiated
alternative at a lower cost is better off under wholesale price discrimination than under uniform pricing.
In the next section, we focus on this alternative efficiency channel from a dynamic perspective. We assume that
the retailing costs are zero (d = 0i , i A B= , ) and analyze how the pricing regime affects retailers’ investment in
reducing the cost of acquiring product S.13 While this is not without loss of generality, it allows us to derive closed
form solutions, compare market outcomes under discriminatory and uniform pricing regimes, and highlight the
corresponding effects.
4 | COST ‐REDUCTION INVESTMENTS
We write the retailers’ profits in the reduced‐form investment games under discriminatory and uniform pricing as
functions of their cost‐reduction choices, by substituting into (1) the second‐stage results presented in (2) and (4) and
deducting the quadratic cost‐reduction investments.
Under wholesale price discrimination, retailer i chooses a cost‐reduction level mi to maximize its profit given by
π βα βα γ β γβ β γ
m= ( − 2 Δ ) + (4 − 3 )(Δ )
36 ( − ) −
( )
2
,iPD
i i i
2 2 2
2 2
2
(5)
where α c m mΔ = ( − + 2 − )i i j .
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Using the first‐order conditions for the profit maximization (∂ ∕∂π m = 0,iPD i i A B= , ), the equilibrium cost‐
reduction levels are
≡m m γβα β γ α cβ β γ β m= =
− (4 − 3 )( − )
3(1 − 3 )( − ) + .i
PD
j
PD PD
2 2
2 2 2 (6)
Substituting (6) into (2), the equilibrium wholesale prices under price discrimination are
≡w w β γ β α γ α cβ β γ β w= =
( − )[(4 − 9 ) + 9 ( − )]
2[3(1 − 3 )( − ) + ] .A
PD
B
PD PD
2 2
2 2 2 (7)
Due to symmetry, the retailers choose the same cost‐reduction level and pay the same wholesale price in a given
pricing regime. However, as under price discrimination, the dominant supplier is unable to commit to a common price,
the retailers’ incentives to invest in reducing the cost of acquiring the competitive supplied product are different from
those under uniform pricing. A given unilateral reduction in a retailer’s cost of acquiring the competitively supplied
input leads to a larger discount from a price‐discriminating dominant supplier than from a nondiscriminating supplier.
Under uniform pricing, retailer i chooses its cost‐reduction level mi to maximize
π βα γ β γβ β γ
m= (2 − Δ̄ ) + 16( − )(Δ )
144 ( − ) −
( )
2
,iUP
i i i
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
where α c m mΔ̄ = 2 − 2 + 7 − 5i i j and Δi is defined below (5).
Solving the system of first‐order conditions for the profit maximization (∂ ∕∂π m = 0,iUP i i A B= , ), the symmetric
equilibrium cost‐reduction level under uniform pricing is
m γβα β γ α cβ β γ β=
7 − (16 − 9 )( − )
9(1 − 4 )( − ) + 7 .
UP
2 2
2 2 2 (8)
Substituting (8) into (4), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale price under uniform pricing
w β γ β α γ α cβ β γ β=
2( − )[(4 − 9 ) + 9 ( − )]
9(1 − 4 )( − ) + 7 .
UP
2 2
2 2 2 (9)
If the profit functions, πiPD and πiUP, are strictly concave and the best response mapping is a contraction, the reduced‐
form game has a unique equilibrium under the two pricing regimes. The required conditions are presented in the
appendix. The most restrictive one is the strict concavity of πiUP which underlies the sufficient condition below.14
Condition 1
β γ β β3( − )(5 − 24 ) + 49 < 0.2 2 2
We are now ready to compare the market outcomes under wholesale price discrimination and uniform pricing.
Proposition 1 Suppose Condition 1 holds. Compared to uniform pricing, wholesale price discrimination results in
(a) a larger reduction in the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied product, (b) lower wholesale prices, (c) a
smaller quantity of dominant supplier’s product, (d) a larger quantity of the competitively supplied product, and (e)
lower retail prices for both varieties.
Both retailers invest more in cost reduction under wholesale price discrimination than under uniform pricing. With
price discrimination, the wholesale price difference w w( − )B A increases in the cost advantage for acquiring the
substitute product c c( − )B A . If retailer i can source S at a lower cost than its rival, it has a stronger incentive than its
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competitor to substitute sales ofU with sales of S. Therefore, the supplier offers retailer i a relatively better wholesale
price to mitigate this incentive. In contrast, with uniform pricing, the retailer shares the benefit of the additional cost
reduction with its rival, so the incentive to invest in cost reduction is lower.
Our investment analysis considers marginal cost reductions associated with the competitively supplied product only.
Inderst and Valletti (2009) focus mainly on cost reductions that apply to both the dominant supplier’s product and a
perfect substitute. In their model, the constraint on the dominant firm’s pricing works through single‐product retailers’
threat to switch all of their purchases from the dominant supplier to alternative supply sources which are perfect
substitutes. When the costs of downstream firms differ, the uniform wholesale price does not depend on the cost of the
less efficient firm and it is equal to the discriminatory wholesale price offered to the more efficient firm. Therefore, with
uniform pricing, the incentives to reduce the wholesale price play no role in the cost‐reduction choice of one of the two
downstream firms. In contrast, with price discrimination, the wholesale price offered to the less efficient firm depends
on its cost so that the incentives to reduce the wholesale price do play a role in the cost‐reduction choices of both firms.
So, a change from uniform to discriminatory pricing increases the equilibrium investment of the downstream firm that
invests less than its rival under the former regime. The change in the equilibrium investment of the other downstream
firm is ambiguous.
In an extension where the downstream firms can invest to reduce the cost of the alternative supply after bypassing
the dominant supplier, Inderst and Valletti (2009) show that, with uniform pricing, investment equilibrium is still
asymmetric. In an example with linear demand and quadratic investment costs, they show that, if the fixed cost of
switching to the alternative source of supply is low, both firms invest more with discriminatory pricing. Intuitively, with
a low fixed cost, the equilibrium investments of the two firms under uniform pricing differ less, so the negative impact
of strategic substitution on the more efficient firm’s investment is smaller and likely to be offset. Our results
complement theirs by showing that price discrimination can improve dynamic efficiency even in a setting where both
firms’ cost‐reduction investments are affected by the incentives to reduce the wholesale price.
Proposition 2 Suppose Condition 1 holds. Total welfare and the dominant supplier’s profit are lower, while
downstream welfare, calculated as the sum of downstream profits and consumer surplus, is higher under wholesale
price discrimination than under uniform pricing.
Price discrimination has a negative impact on the upstream supplier’s profit. With discriminatory pricing, the retailers
invest more and achieve lower marginal costs of acquiring the competitively supplied variety. This decreases both the
wholesale price and the sales volume of the dominant supplier’s product. Discriminatory pricing also harms total welfare.
However, it boosts downstream welfare (i.e., the sum of retailers’ profits and consumer surplus), as final consumers benefit
from lower retail prices and downstream firms from lower costs of acquiring the competitively supplied product.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies wholesale price discrimination in a setting where an upstream dominant supplier and a competitive
fringe supply differentiated varieties to two multiproduct downstream retailers. It focuses on the impact of price
discrimination by the dominant supplier on the dynamic efficiency of the market and shows that the practice improves
multiproduct retailers’ incentives to reduce the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied product.
Regardless of the pricing regime, in our setting there is no price discrimination in equilibrium and the multiproduct
retailers offer both varieties. Nevertheless, if the dominant supplier cannot commit to charging uniform wholesale
prices, the retailers choose a technology with a lower cost of acquiring the competitively supplied product.
Discriminatory pricing provides a lower price to the retailer which can access the differentiated alternative at a lower
cost. As a result, investment in reducing the cost of access to the competitively supplied variety and downstream welfare
are higher under discriminatory than under uniform pricing. We conduct our analysis from a competition policy
perspective and so formulate a model where retailers operate in the same downstream market. However, it can be
shown that our central finding is not dependent on competition between retailers and carries over to a setting where the
retailers operate in separate downstream markets.
Our study identifies situations where discriminatory pricing improves the dynamic efficiency of the market and
complements existing work. In particular, combined with the results in DeGraba (1990), our findings point to a wider
principle that governs the dynamic efficiency of wholesale price discrimination by a dominant supplier. The practice
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fosters downstream investments that decrease multiproduct retailers’ demand for the dominant supplier’s product,
while it stifles downstream investments that increase multiproduct retailers’ demand for the dominant supplier’s
product. In an example where the retailers could lower both the retailing cost and the cost of accessing the
competitively supplied product by making a single investment, we were able to show that the net effect of price
discrimination on downstream investment incentives can run in either direction depending on which cost is
more affected. In general, the overall impact of wholesale price discrimination on innovation and welfare depends on
the trade‐off between different effects and therefore on the specific market conditions.
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END NOTES
1 For example, requested order lead times, delivery sizes, third‐party risks, and payments terms can introduce an element of horizontal differentiation from the
perspective of buyers.
2 A retailer may need additional warehouse space to take larger deliveries from the fringe suppliers and distribute to its own stores, for instance. The
investment would bring no benefits in handling the dominant supplier’s product whenever that product is delivered to its individual stores in smaller
quantities by the supplier or an independent wholesaler who carries the dominant supplier’s product.
3 The impact of discriminatory pricing on innovation incentives has also been studied by Choi (1995) in an international trade context and by Choi and Kim
(2010) in relation to net neutrality regulation.
4 Katz (1987) shows that if only one pricing regime leads to integration this occurs under uniform pricing.
5 Herweg and Müller (2012) endogenize downstream industry structure and show that input price discrimination fosters entry which often improves welfare,
although entry may also harm welfare by creating severe inefficiency in production.
6 Unlike Katz (1987), where the threat of backward integration is only credible for the largest buyer, in Inderst and Valletti (2009) both retailers can credibly
bypass the monopolist supplier.
7 As in our discussion of DeGraba (1990), in the context of our model, this would be a reduction in downstream retailing costs as the cost reduction applies to all sales
of the downstream firm, independently of the upstream product choice. In Inderst and Valletti (2009), this reduction would apply to both the upstreammonopolist’s
product and to the alternative supply when the fixed cost of access is paid, but in equilibrium downstream firms use only one supply source.
8 Article 102 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides the ground for competition agencies to bring cases against manufacturers who
charge discriminatory prices to resellers.
9 See the discussion in paragraphs 173‐193 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance in case T‐228/97 Irish Sugar plc versus Commission of the European
Communities available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris.
10 It can be shown that our qualitative results are robust in a setting where P q q( , ) =U U S α β q γq− −U U U S and P q q( , ) =S U S α β q γq− −S S S U with αk, βk ,
γ > 0, and β γ>k for k U= , S . However, for expositional simplicity, we focus on α α=U S and β β=U S .
11 Our analysis focuses on linear wholesale prices. A different stream of literature explores discriminatory nonlinear prices. See, for instance, Inderst and
Shaffer (2009), the two‐part tariff analysis in Arya and Mittendorf (2010), and Herweg and Müller (2014).
12 When downstream firms are producers these can also be interpreted as the marginal cost of converting one unit of upstream input into one unit of
downstream product.
13 We focus on the cost of acquiring the differentiated upstream variety, but our results apply more generally to any investment that reduces a cost specific to
that variety (or increases the intercept of the corresponding linear inverse demand).
14 These are based on the standard contraction approach, see Vives (2001) [Chapter 2]. Strict concavity of the profit functions guarantees that retailer i’s best
response is unique and given by a function. If the best response mapping is a contraction, then the reduced‐form game has a unique equilibrium. In our
model, due to ex ante symmetry, the unique equilibrium for a given pricing regime is symmetric.
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APPENDIX A
Conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the reduced‐form investment game
1. Wholesale price discrimination.
The retailers’ profits are strictly concave iff, for i A B= , ,
∂
∂ ⇔ ≡
π
m
β γ β β
β β γ Φ< 0
3( − )(2 − 3 ) + 2
9 ( − ) < 0.
i
PD
i
2
2
2 2 2
2 2 1
Note that Condition 1 is a sufficient condition for Φ < 01 .
There is a unique investment equilibrium if, for i j A B, = , and ≠i j,
∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂ ⇔ ≡
π
m
π
m m
β γ β β
β β γ Φ+ < 0
3( − )(1 − 3 ) +
9 ( − ) < 0.
i
PD
i
i
PD
i j
2
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
Note that Φ < 01 is a sufficient condition for Φ < 02 .
2. Uniform pricing.
The retailers’ profits in the reduced‐form game are strictly concave iff, for i A B= , ,
∂
∂ ⇔
π
m
β γ β β
β β γ< 0
3( − )(5 − 24 ) + 49
72 ( − ) < 0.
i
UP
i
2
2
2 2 2
2 2
This leads to Condition 1 as β γ> > 0.
There is a unique investment equilibrium if, for i, j A= , B and ≠i j,
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∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂ ⇔ ≡
π
m
π
m m
β γ β β
β β γ Φ+ < 0
9( − )(1 − 4 ) + 7
36 ( − ) < 0.
i
UP
i
i
UP
i j
2
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 3
Note that Condition 1 is a sufficient condition for Φ < 03 and also for Φ < 01 .
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) Using (6) and (8),m m− =PD UP ∕q γ βΦ− (2 ) > 0AU 2 where q > 0AU is the equilibrium quantity of U supplied by
retailer A under uniform pricing. The inequality follows from Φ < 02 , which holds if Condition 1 does.
(b) Using (7) and (9), w w− =PD UP ∕m m γ β− ( − ) (2 ) < 0PD UP .
(c) The equilibrium total quantities ofU under wholesale price discrimination and uniform pricing are, respectively,
q β β α γ α cβ β β q
β β α γ α c
β β β=
[(4 − 9 ) + 9 ( − )]
3[3(1 − 3 ) ̄ + ] and =
4 [(4 − 9 ) + 9 ( − )]
3[9(1 − 4 ) ̄ + 7 ] ,PD
U
UP
U
2 2 (A1)
where β β γ̄ = −2 2. Then, q q− =PDU UPU ∕m m γ β γ− ( − ) [3( − )] < 0PD UP 2 2 .
(d) The equilibrium total quantities of S under wholesale price discrimination and uniform pricing are,
respectively,
q γ β α β α cβ β β q
γ β α β α c
β β β=
−[ (2 − 9 ) + 9 ˘ ( − )]
3[3(1 − 3 ) ̄ + ] and =
−2[ (1 − 18 ) + 18 ˘ ( − )]
3[9(1 − 4 ) ̄ + 7 ] ,PD
S
UP
S
2 2 (A2)
where β β γ˘ = 2 −2 2. Then, q q− =PDS UPS ∕m m β γ β β γ( − )(2 − ) [3 ( − )] > 0PD UP 2 2 2 2 .
(e) The equilibrium retail prices ofU under wholesale price discrimination and uniform pricing are, respectively,
P β β β α γ β α cβ β β P
β β β α γ β α c
β β β=
[(7 − 18 ) ̄ + ] + 9 × ̄( − )
3[3(1 − 3 ) ̄ + ] and =
[(25 − 72 ) ̄ + 7 ] + 36 × ̄( − )
3[9(1 − 4 ) ̄ + 7 ] .PD
U
UP
U
2
2
2
2
Then, P P− =PDU UPU ∕m m γ β− ( − ) (3 ) < 0PD UP . The equilibrium retail prices of S under wholesale price
discrimination and uniform pricing are, respectively,
P β β β α γβα ββcβ β β P
β β β α γβα ββc
β β β=
3[3(1 − ) ̄ + ] − 2 − 18 ̄
3[3(1 − 3 ) ̄ + ] and =
3[3(3 − 4 ) ̄ + 7 ] − 14 − 72 ̄
3[9(1 − 4 ) ̄ + 7 ] .PD
S
UP
S
2
2
2
2
Then, P P− =PDS UPS ∕m m− 2( − ) 3 < 0PD UP for product S. □
Proof of Proposition 2 Consumers’ gross utility from consumption is
∕V αq αq β q γq q β q= + − 1 2[ ( ) + 2 + ( ) ].U S U U S S2 2
Total welfare is consumers’ gross utility minus total costs. Using (6)–(9), (A1), and (A2), the total welfare, upstream
profit, and downstream welfare differences between wholesale price discrimination and uniform pricing are
∕
∕
∕
W W m m Φ γ β β γ
π π w w β β γ
W π W π m m Φ γ β β γ
− = ( − ) [3 − 12 ( − )] < 0,
− = [( ) − ( ) ][2 3( − )] < 0,
( − ) − ( − ) = ( − ) [− + 12 ( − )] > 0,
PD UP PD UP
M
PD
M
UP PD UP
PD
M
PD UP
M
UP PD UP
2
3
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2
3
2 2 2
where the inequalities follow from Φ < 03 , which holds if Condition 1 does. □
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